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by.
Mark A. Edelman
Agriculture and
Public Policy Sconomist
Recently, no factor has been more
important to the health and wealth of
agriculture than the exchange value of
the dollar in international trade. The
purposes of this newsletter are to (l)
review recent trends in exchange rates,
(2) explore the consequences and causes
of, these trends, and (5) analyze the
policy options for altering the exchange
value of the dollar.
WHAT'S HAPPENED TO THE VALUE OF THE
DOLLAR? The Federal Reserve Board
publishes a measure of the general ex
change value of the U.S. dollar. This
index compares the dollar to a composite
of currencies representing Germany,
Japan, France, England, Canada, Italy,
Netherlands, Belgium, Sweden, and
Switzerland. The respective exchange
rates between the U.S. dollar and each
foreign currency are weighted by the
respective shares of global trade for a
base period of 1972-1976. In Figure 1,
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the monthly indices for the exchange
value of the dollar are listed for the
past 15 years. The March 1973 index
value equals 100.0.
These data show the 1983 annual
average index value to be 125•3' This
means that in 1983 the dollar exchanged
for 25 percent more Japanese Yen, German
Marks, and other currencies than it did
in March 1973. Notice that the present
index value is at a 15 year high point.
This means that the dollar is stronger
than at any other time since 1968.
Also, we can see that the exchange
rate index hit a 15 year low during
July 1980. The annual average index
value for 1980 was 87.4. So, from 1980
to the present peak, the value of the
dollar has risen by 37 percent,
according to the Federal Reserve index.
WHAT ARE THE CONSEQUENCES of a
rapidly changing exchange value of the
dollar? From the figure, we see that
the value of the dollar declined by
about 20 percent during the early
1970's. When the dollar declined in
value", our exports automatically became
20 percent cheaper for our foreign
customers. Imports into the U.S. became
20 percent more expensive. As.a result,
U.S. consumers experienced higher prices
in the.short run.
The devaluation of the dollar and
the warming of East-West relations were
the two key factors that set the stage
for rapid expansion of agricultural
exports during the early 1970's. As a
result, the declining value of the
dollar was one of the major reasons that
U.S. agriculture experienced record in
come during the 1970's.
Now during the 1980's, the value of
the dollar has risen by more than a
third. As the value of the dollar in
creased relative to other currencies,
our exports automatically became a third
more expensive for our foreign customers
compared to our competition. Also,
imports into the U.S. became a third
cheaper for U.S. consumers compared to
U.S. produced goods that compete with
imports.
In view of the recent rise in the
value of the dollar, it is easy to see
why the bloom is off the export market.
Total U.S. exports declined 13 percent
from $229 billion in 1981 to $200 bil
lion in 1983. During the same period,
agricultural exports declined 20 percent
from $43.8 billion to $34.8 billion.
However, total U.S. imports increased 6
percent from $254 billion to $270 bil
lion and agricultural imports remained
about the same at $15 to $17 billion.
Not surprisingly, agricultural and
non-agricultural exporters are calling
for export expansion subsidies. Also, an
increasing number of U.S. industries
that compete with imports are clamoring
for import protection. For example,
steel, shoes, and copper have recently
petitioned the International Trade Com
mission to restrict U.S. imports.
A rising dollar forces us to re
allocate resources and labor in the
trade sectors and between the trade and
non-trade sectors of our economy. These
adjustments are not painless. They mean
that profits, wages, and employment
potential decline in export sectors and
in domestic sectors that compete with
imports. If the value of the dollar
remains strong, agricultural exports and
incomes are likely to remain soft.
WHAT CAUSES THE YALUE OF THE DOLLAR
TO CHANGE? In general, three factors
heavily influence exchange rates: (1 )
real interest rates, (2) political and
economic stability around the world and
(3) the balance of trade.
REAL INTEREST RATES are simply a
measure of actual interest rates minus
the inflation rate. If the inflation
rate is greater than the interest rate,
savers have no .incentive to save.
Savers receive an increasing incentive
to save as actual interest rates rise
higher and higher above the inflation
rate.
Table 1 compares the real interest
rates of the major trade currency na
tions between 1979 and the first half of
1983. The table shows that the U.S. has
<5^
shifted from negative real interest
rates in 1979 to the highest real
interest rates in the world since 1982,
Table 1. Estimated Real Interest Rates, 1979-85-
Country 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983^
U.S. - . 10 - .14 5.98 6.06 5.48
Germany 2.59 4.04 6.21 3.58 2.07
Japan 2.65 -0.75 2.79 4.52 4.54
France -1 .32 -1 .10 1.96 2.63 5.43
Canada 2.58 2.60 5.32 2.84 3.57
U.K. .19 -1 .90 1 .39 2.97 5.03
For first half of 1983 only.
Source: Annual Report 1983 and International Financial
Statistics, International Monetary Fund, August, 1983-
Very simply, the wealth around the
world tends to travel to where it can
receive the highest real return on in
vestment. Since 1981, the U.S. has been
that location. In order to invest in
the U.S., foreign interests must acquire
dollars in the international money mar
kets. This puts upward pressure on the
exchange value of the dollar.
Second, WORLD DEBT PROBLEMS, the
WORLD RECESSION, and a rise in POLITICAL
INSTABILITY around the world tend to
encourage wealthy interests to locate
part of their holdings in "safe havens".
Foreign interests act to protect their
wealth by placing it in a "safe"
currency. This protects their wealth
even though their home country may be
going through economic and political
chaos. Because the U.S. is a "safe
haven" for international wealth, many
foreign interests have been acquiring
dollars.
Third, the U.S. experienced a
record TRADE DEFICIT in 1983. A trade
deficit means that we have been im
porting more than we have been ex
porting. During 1983, total U.S. ex
ports were $200 billion, total U.S.
imports were $270 billion, and so our
trade deficit was $70 billion.
To put U.S. agricultural trade in
perspective, total agricultural exports
amounted to $34.8 billion or only half
of the overall trade deficit. Total
agricultural imjwrts were $16.4 billion,
so the agricultural trade balance showed
an $18.4 billion surplus; The agricul
tural trade surplus is important to the
degree that it contributes to reducing
the overall trade deficit.
Generally, large overall • trade
deficits put downward pressure on the
exchange value of the dollar. ¥hen we
import more than we export, dollars flow
,out of.the U.S. to cover the full pay
ment for imports. This adds to the'
supply of dollars in the international
money markets and tends to put downward
pressure on the exchange value of the
dollar.
In the last four years, the rising
value of the dollar indicates that the
influence of our high real interest
rates and the "safe haven" incentive
have • been stronger than the impact of
the increasing trade deficit. As the
trade deficit continues to grow, this
picture could change and the value of
the dollar could decline somewhat. . Some
trade experts are predicting the trade
deficit to rise above $100 billion for
the current year.
Most recently, the value of the
dollar has declined from a peak in
January to the level experienced last
fall. However, the present level is
still over a third higher relative to
1980 levels. The future direction of
our exchange rate depends upon
developments in real , interest rates,
world stability and trade deficits. Any
rapid changes in these factors would
heavily influence the exchange value of
the dollar.
WHAT ARE THE POLICY OPTIONS for
coping with the rising value of the
dollar? Assume for the moment that your
goal is to lower the exchange value of
the dollar. This is a big assumption
because some special interests benefit
from a rising dollar. But let's make
this assumption anyway . In lowering
the exchange value of the dollar, there
are seven policy options to consider:
1. ¥e could re-inflate the economy
to lower our real interest rates and
flood the international money markets
with dollars. Up to now, the Federal
Reserve Board has vowed to continue to
fight inflation in order to preserve our
nation's long-term economic stability.
2. ¥e could have the other major
currency nations follow tighter monetary
policies to increase their real interest
rates and make their currencies
stronger. This approach has already
been suggested to our allies. Their
initial response , was for us to not
meddle in their internal economic policy
affairs and to cut our Federal budget
deficit first.
3. ¥e could target foreign aid and
foreign policy to reduce political and
economic instability around the world.
This approach is sometimes easier said
than done.
4. ¥e could adopt import restric
tions and export expansion subsidies to
offset the rising value of the dollar.
This approach may sound good to the
special interest groups involved, but is
not likely to survive for long. Efforts
to restrict imports are bound to con
flict with efforts to expand exports
because potential customers will refuse
our exports unless we accept their im
ports.
5. ¥e could lower our real interest
rates by cutting the Federal budget
deficit, or cutting tax incentives for
private borrowers, or increasing tax
incentives for private savers. These
approaches are difficult for our
national political- decision-makers to
accomplish in an election year.
6. ¥e could tax foreign investment
in the United States to reduce the de
mand for dollars in the international
money markets. This option would tend
to put upward pressure on our interest
rates in the short run because the pool
of loanable funds for credit would be
reduced.
7. ¥e could do nothing and allow
the increasing trade deficit and/or the
risk of recession or inflation to lower
our exchange rates. , These market
factors are likely to bring the value of
the dollar down somewhat, unless
interest rates climb or political insta
bility around the world rapidly rises.
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